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I. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter provides general information, research questions, discussion of the 
issues, scope, methodology, benefits of the study, and organization of the study. 
A. GENERAL INFORMATION  
The purpose of this research is to follow a tailored systems engineering approach 
in order to identify an effective and suitable design for a U.S. Army secure storage 
system.  Such a system must provide for the security, protected storage, availability, and 
accountability of selected items of soldier tactical equipment in garrison, during strategic 
deployment, and when deployed for training or operations.  The acquisition of such a 
system is warranted due to the extensive array of weapons and high-value equipment 
procured by the Army in recent years, and the large number of additional systems 
planned for procurement in the near future.  The goal is to develop a secure storage 
design that can satisfy a current and stated requirement of several U.S. Army weapons 
and equipment programs and ultimately be considered for acquisition program status by 
the U.S. Army.     
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Question 
What is a system design that can provide the Army with security, protected 
storage, availability, and accountability of sensitive and high-value non-sensitive items 
and equipment in garrison, during strategic deployment, and when deployed for training 
and operations? 
2. Subsidiary Questions 
a. What features and performance levels will the system’s users require? 
b. What are the major security and transportation requirements and constraints in 
developing a mobile secure storage system for a fixed facility, and for its 
deployment into an area of operations? 
c. What commercial equipment and technologies are available which might be 
suitable for inclusion as part of a mobile secure storage system? 
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d. What are the benefits of such a secure system design for the Army and DoD? 
C. DISCUSSION 
As the Army develops and fields new or improved tactical equipment for the 
soldier, the challenge of providing for its security, unit-level maintenance, availability, 
and accountability will exceed the capacity of present systems. This new or improved 
tactical equipment will include a number of high-cost, technically advanced items that 
will present storage and other logistical challenges.  In garrison, the fixed facilities at unit 
level are inadequate for the projected need (both quantitatively and qualitatively).  The 
same inadequacy holds true when the anticipated items of equipment are in transit to a 
training area or to a mission area of operations.  Finally, there are no current systems 
specifically designed to provide security, protected storage, availability, and 
accountability of sensitive and high-value non-sensitive items during training or 
operational deployments [Ref. 1]. 
D. SCOPE OF THESIS 
This thesis uses a tailored application of the systems engineering process to 
develop a design for a U.S. Army secure storage system.  This study investigates the 
users requirements for such a system as well as requirements and constraints derived 
from security regulations, military and commercial intermodal transportation methods, 
and current Army facilities and force structure.  It then examines existing Government 
and commercial equipment to assess their suitability for satisfying secure storage and 
transportation requirements.  Ultimately, this system engineering analysis will produce 
the physical architecture of a secure storage system, as well as selected items of the 
system architecture.   
E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis research was obtained from three separate 
data collection efforts.  First, a comprehensive literature and Internet review was 
conducted.  This review included the examination of regulations, DoD doctrinal manuals, 
systems engineering guides and texts, articles, journals, periodicals, commercial sales 
brochures, and documentation (briefings, memorandums, and studies) from various Army 
and DoD organizations.  Second, an interview was conducted using a synergistic “User 
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IPT” approach, where eleven U.S. Army officers were brought together to generate 
requirements based on their extensive experience as company commanders and staff 
officers.  Third, phone interviews, personal interviews, and e-mail consultations were 
conducted with various Army personnel, subject matter experts, and civilian contractors 
to expand or verify the findings of the first two collection efforts. 
F. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This study serves as a basis for future research and discussion on designing and 
developing transportable secure storage systems as well as examining storage solutions 
within existing facilities.  Furthermore, this study hopes to bring insight into developing a 
standard, systemic solution that can address a multitude of future Army and DoD storage 
requirements.  Such a systemic solution could ease the storage planning burdens of 
program managers, increase storage efficiency and transportability, and reduce overall 
system life-cycle costs.   
G. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized in the following manner:   
Chapter I provides general information, research questions, discussion of the 
issues, scope, methodology, benefits of the study, and organization of the study. 
Chapter II presents background information on the need for expanded sensitive 
items and valued non-sensitive item storage and security systems in the Army.  It also 
provides an explanation of the systems engineering process, which is used as the analysis 
tool for this thesis. 
Chapter III is a presentation of four primary sets of data to support further 
analysis.  The results of a “User IPT” are presented first to establish the needs and 
requirements of the user as it relates to secure storage.  Next, information on security 
standards is presented to gain an understanding of regulatory requirements for secure 
storage and an understanding of existing secure facilities.  Third, since the system must 
be mobile for deployment, DoD and international compatibility, transportability, and 
loading requirements/constraints are examined.  Lastly, a market review of a variety of 
commercial systems is conducted to highlight existing features that may benefit the 
design process. 
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Chapter IV is a tailored systems engineering analysis.  Requirements and 
functions are analyzed and then synthesized into what the researcher believes to be the 
most effective and suitable secure storage system design.  This design is then analyzed to 
ensure it meets all required functions and satisfies the major system requirements.  
Chapter V examines the primary and subsidiary research questions.  Conclusions 














This chapter presents background information on the need for expanded sensitive 
items and valued non-sensitive item storage and security systems in the Army.  It also 
provides an explanation of the systems engineering process, which is used as the analysis 
tool for this thesis. 
A. THE NEED FOR A SECURE STORAGE SYSTEM IN THE ARMY 
Secure storage requirements and procedures within tactical U.S. Army units 
(Division level and below) have remained largely unchanged for the last century; 
however, these requirements are rapidly evolving and expanding as the acquisition of 
numerous sensitive and expensive equipment items rises dramatically.  As the Army 
advances through its current transformation effort, which is largely focused on high 
technology equipment solutions, this situation is exacerbated.   
The primary security concerns at the tactical level involve both sensitive and 
some non-sensitive items.  There are two broad categories of sensitive items: arms, 
ammunition, and explosives and classified data and equipment.  Those non-sensitive 
items that are easily pilfered and have a significant dollar value (known hereto as valued 
non-sensitive items) constitute a security concern as well.  This section discusses the 
recent history of the Army’s facilities and procedures used to secure such items.  
Subsequently, it outlines the growing need for additional sensitive and valued non-
sensitive item secure storage systems with an increased level of capabilities.     
The storage area for the all Army sensitive items and the majority of valued non-
sensitive items is the unit arms room, which is generally maintained at the company level.  
The non-sensitive item storage area is typically either the unit supply room or a secure 
storage area within the supply room.  Sensitive items not stored at company level are bulk 
ammunition and explosives, which are centralized at installation level; however, the 
scope of this thesis will focus only on the company level secure storage.   
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The company arms room is the Army’s primary sensitive item security facility 
and is always of heavy construction: steel reinforced masonry or concrete; a heavy metal 
door and lock; and an internal, electronic, Intruder Detections System (IDS) to meet 
specific, Army-wide, security regulations.  Additionally, access to the arms room is 
highly restricted and entry is controlled and recorded daily as is the issue and receipt of 
its contents.  The secure storage area for non-sensitive items, on the other hand, is not 
required to be a hardened structure, but rather is constructed to meet loose physical 
security standards in order to basically resist any unsupported method of forced entry.  
For example, a typical non-sensitive item storage area is fabricated from heavy wire-
mesh panels bolted together and placed within a larger common area within a company’s 
supply room or administrative area.  The non-sensitive item storage area typically has 
various lockable containers residing within it as an additional security measure.    
The Army company commander is required to store all his arms, ammunition, and 
classified equipment (usually unkeyed/zeroed communications security devices) in his 
arms room; however, based on an installation level and as well as his own personal risk 
assessment, the average commander will typically store much of his valued non-sensitive 
items in the arms room as well.     
Throughout these two secure areas, with the exception of standard small arms and 
crew-served weapons racks in the arms room, there is no standardized container or 
storage system.   Consequently, the arms room and non-sensitive item storage area are 
filled with a variety of commercial metal storage wall lockers or cabinets, or locally 
fabricated wooden storage compartments of virtually every size and shape imaginable.  
This system of storage has been adequate for many years due primarily to the relative 
stability of the number of personnel in company-sized units and the standard 
configuration of equipment issued to the average soldier.  There has been little variation 
in the tools of the soldier’s trade since before World War II; primarily consisting of his 
basic weapon, ammunition, load bearing equipment, and perhaps a radio.  There was 
formerly no real extra or optional equipment to be stored for special environments or 
missions; consequently, the average current arms room and non-sensitive item storage 
area, built largely prior to the 1990s, had a place for everything and everything had its 
place.  When the company deployed it all went on the soldier’s person or in company 
vehicles. 
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Beginning in the 1970’s, the Department of Defense began to apply high-
technology solutions to Army weapons and communication systems.  The need to 
develop even more capable and lightweight systems continued to grow and the 
commercial explosion of digital information technology in the 1980’s - and especially in 
the 1990’s - greatly enabled this development.  However, with each new technological 
application to a legacy system, or the development of a completely new high-tech system, 
came new or additional requirements for storage and security.     
As a result of this wave of acquisition of new and improved systems, when a U.S. 
Army infantry company draws its gear today in preparation for training or combat, it 
customizes rather than standardizes.  The commander can now mix and match weapons 
systems, optical sights, thermal sights, laser pointing devices, communications gear, etc. 
as never before.  This trend is rapidly continuing as the Army acquires its next generation 
of equipment, namely the Land Warrior system.  This system is designed to be modular, 
and thus customizable, from the outset.  It will add such features as a wearable computer 
and a secure communications and Global Positioning System (GPS) for each soldier that 
will assuredly add to future security needs.  
Despite the ongoing digital revolution, the majority of secure storage inventory 
management is presently accomplished manually.  The inventory, issue, and receipt of 
the contents of secure storage areas is incredibly time consuming and these exhausting 
processes grow ever longer as more items are added to the equation. 
There are three main consequences of today’s boom in sensitive item and valued 
non-sensitive item storage area acquisition: 
  First, the physical space within the average arms rooms has been exhausted.  
While there has been several new sensitive items introduced over the past 10 years (e.g. 
Global Positioning Systems, radios with integrated communications security equipment, 
Javelin missile launch control units, etc.) the majority of the space has been consumed by 
valued non-sensitive item storage area (e.g. new weapon sighting systems; night vision 
devices; non-secure radios; nuclear, biological and chemical detection instruments, etc.).  
The majority of these valued non-sensitive items have hard-sided, individual 
carrying/protective cases, which only exacerbate the impact on physical space within a 
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storage area.   The new Land Warrior System has only one sensitive item: the GPS Type 
III PCMCIA card, yet it has up to seven other components, which average about a cubic 
foot per solder, that will surely be valued non-sensitive items and will likely find their 
way into the arms room [Reg. 2 & 3]. 
  Second, small arms and crew served weapon systems with technological add-ons 
are unable to be stored in their updated configuration.  The standardized racks for 
individual small arms (M16/M4 series of rifles and M249 Squad Automatic Weapons) 
and crew served weapons (M240 Machine Gun, M2 machine gun, and M49 Automatic 
Grenade Launcher) cannot be adjusted; consequently, the cutting-edge sighting systems 
and other target acquisition aids currently applied to these weapons essentially make 
them wider and deeper and they are unable to fit in the existing racks in their updated 
configuration [Ref. 4].  This mandates that such devices be removed prior to storing the 
weapons, thus destroying their sighting zero – hardly a satisfactory storage solution.  
Furthermore, the future acquisition of the Objective Individual Combat Weapon (OICW) 
and the Objective Crew-served Weapon (OCSW), which will be fielded within the next 5 
to 10 years, will require a different secure storage system as well.  
Third, units will need some form of secure storage when deployed.  Since the 
soldier’s weapon systems can be customized there are many items in secure storage that 
will not initially be issued to the soldier, but which he will want to use later to 
accommodate changing threat scenarios and environments.  This presents a problem upon 
deployment, as no longer can the soldier easily transport every item.  Additional secure 
storage space will be required to transport the additional equipment as well as secure it 
during operational use or training.  With the exception of storage within selected 
deploying vehicles, there is no current Army or other DoD system that can satisfy this 
requirement. 
B. INTRODUCTION TO SYSTEMS ENGINEERING  
In order to design and develop a new Army secure storage system in an organized 
and comprehensive fashion, a formalized management method must be utilized.  To this 
end, this thesis will utilize systems engineering management as a guideline for the design 
and analysis effort.   
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 To begin to understand systems engineering it is useful first to define exactly 
what a system is.  The Defense Systems Management College defines a system simply as, 
“an integrated composite of people, products, and processed that provide a capability to 
satisfy a need or objective” [Ref. 5].   Therefore, systems engineering a methodology for 
achieving desired systems.  The DSMC’s definition of systems engineering is a bit more 
insightful: 
 Systems engineering is an interdisciplinary engineering management 
process that evolves and verifies an integrated, life cycle balanced set of 
system solution that satisfy customer needs. Systems engineering is 
accomplished by integrating three major activities:    
• Development phasing - controls the design process and provides baselines 
that coordinate design efforts.   
• Life cycle integration – involves the customers in the design process and 
ensures that the system developed is viable throughout its life.  
• Systems engineering process – provides a structure for solving design 
problems and tracking requirements flow through the design effort. 
[Ref. 6]. 
 Although Developmental phasing is important as a management tool in achieving 
expected levels of progress prior to continuing into a subsequent phase, and Life-cycle 
integration is absolutely essential to ensure the cost and performance of the system are 
acceptable throughout the systems lifetime, of these three activities the Systems 
Engineering Process will be the one this thesis is most concerned with.   
The DSMC defines the Systems Engineering Process as: 
A top-down comprehensive, iterative, and recursive problem solving 
process, applied sequentially through all stages of development that is 
used to provide a structured but flexible process that transforms needs and 
requirements into a set of system product and process descriptions (adding 
value and more detail with each level of development), generate 
information for decision makers, and provide input for the next level of 
development as shown in the figure below the process includes: inputs and 
outputs, requirements analysis, functional analysis and allocation, 
requirements loop, synthesis’ design loop, verification, and system 
analysis and control [Ref. 7]. 
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Figure 1. Systems Engineering Process [From Ref. 8] 
 
The Systems Engineering Process (SEP) is the heart of Systems Engineering 
management and thus is the main focus of this thesis.  In the simplest terms the System 
Engineering Process seeks to take what the customer wants and needs through a 
methodical process, ultimately providing him with a product or process definition that 
meets the requirements at a given level of development.  Typically during the SEP, 
architectures are generated to better describe and understand the process.  The DoD uses 
three architectures that describe important aspect of the system: functional, physical, and 
system.  To properly understand how this transformation takes place and where the 
architectures fit in, the major steps of the SEP are briefly explained below.  Also refer to 
the Figure 1 to assist with the explanation. 
The SE Process Inputs consists of the customer’s needs, objective, and constraints 
that come from any number of sources.  These inputs are then analyzed during 
Requirements Analysis to produce requirements that define what the system must do and 
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how it must perform.  The difference between the raw inputs and defined requirements is 
that requirements are understandable, unambiguous, comprehensive, complete and 
concise.  Functional Analysis/Allocation takes the requirements and allocates functions to 
them.  The higher-level functions are then decomposed to lower and lower levels of 
functionality.  What results is a description of the product in terms of what it does 
logically and in terms of the performance required.  This description is often known as 
the functional architecture.  Functional Analysis and Allocation allows for a better 
understanding of what the system has to do, in what ways it can do it, and to some extent, 
the priorities and conflicts associated with lower-level functions. The Requirements Loop 
is a feedback method that ensures each function identified is traceable back to a 
requirement, ensuring the allocation effort has been successful.  Design Synthesis is the 
process of defining the system by its physical elements, which together make up and 
defines the system – in other words, the final proposed product.  This physical solution is 
often referred to as the physical architecture, and at the detailed design level, where all 
products to support the system are identified, it is known as the system architecture. The 
Design Loop is another feedback method that insures the physical design can execute the 
functions at the required levels of performance. The final Verification Loop ultimately 
ensures that the solution satisfies the original requirements.  Systems Analysis and 
Control is an overarching management tool that applies to all steps in the SEP.  It 
includes technical management activities required to measure progress, evaluate, 
progress, perform tradeoffs, evaluate and select alternatives, and document data and 
decisions.  Lastly, the final Process Output most often depends on the level of 
development.  In this thesis the process output will be the storage system’s physical 


































This chapter is a presentation of four primary sets of data to support further 
analysis.  The results of a “User IPT” are presented first to establish the needs and 
requirements of the user as it relates to secure storage.  Next, information on security 
standards is presented to gain an understanding of regulatory requirements for secure 
storage and an understanding of existing secure facilities.  Third, since the system must 
be mobile for deployment, DoD and international compatibility, transportability, and 
loading requirements/constraints are examined.  Lastly, a market review of a variety of 
commercial systems is conducted to highlight existing features that may benefit the 
design process. 
A. USER REQUIREMENTS 
The following customer requirements were gathered using a synergistic “User 
IPT” approach where eleven U.S. Army officers were brought together to provide input 
based on their extensive experience as company commanders and Division-level-and-
below staff officers.  Each of these officers had between six and fourteen years of 
operational training experience, and each had been deployed to at least one major 
stability and support operation (SASO) in the Caribbean, the Balkan States, or Southwest 
Asia.  The Army’s Armor, Artillery, Aviation, Engineer, Infantry, Military Police, 
Military Intelligence, Ordnance, and Quartermaster communities were represented in this 
sample [Ref. 9].  The researcher tasked this IPT with generating requirements for a 
deployable secure storage system suitable for use by the majority of U.S. Army units.  
The researcher’s intent was for this IPT to develop a preliminary and rudimentary 
operational requirements document (ORD).    
The following statement was provided to the users to begin the session.  It listed 
the shortcomings of existing systems and all the officers concurred with its general 
accuracy:   
Support facilities requirements are not being considered during the 
acquisition of soldier system components.  Consequence: there currently 
is, or there will be in the very near future, a shortage of secure storage 
space in existing facilities.  The proliferation of sensitive and valued non-
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sensitive items such as small arms accessories, night vision equipment, 
geo-positional devices, and communications equipment fielded to the 
force over the past several years has resulted in severe crowding of unit 
secure storage facilities.  As we continue to field a considerable array of 
new equipment over the next several years, the problem will worsen.  
Additionally, our storage facilities predominantly employ manual 
accounting procedures that make issuance, maintenance, and 
accountability of equipment a cumbersome process. These facilities are 
not deployable with the unit. 
The threat described to the IPT was estimated as small groups (2-10 persons) 
organized to infiltrate perimeter defenses and target a secure storage system.  Their tools 
to gain access to the secure storage system could include, heavy blunt force instruments, 
manual cutting instruments, flame-cutting torches, small arms, and explosives.  
Additionally, a threat from indirect fire munitions was included as well. 
Four goals for the secure storage requirements generation IPT session were given 
to frame the scope of the problem. 
• A single system adaptable for both home station use and deployment is 
preferred. 
• A system must be deployable by land, sea, and air. 
• A system must meet both current and future secure storage needs (e.g. new 
acquisitions and equipment modifications). 
• The system will provide the greatest operational and logistical 
convenience possible for using units. 
Three basic constraints were provided based on common data concerning Army 
goals for deployable systems and secure storage facilities at the company level. 
• Deployable container must meet ANSI/ISO standards or be able to be 
easily loaded into an ANSI/ISO container to ensure intermodal capability 
and be compatible with or be able to be loaded on the 463L air movement 
system.   
Rationale: Important to ensure that the system can be moved by the largest 
spectrum of military and civilian transportation assets. 
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• Must be deployable via U.S. Air Force C-130 cargo aircraft.   
Rationale: Deployment via C-130 is a key component in meeting current 
“Army Transformation” rapid power projection objectives.  
• All components to be used within a standard Army arms rooms must be 
smaller than the 34 by 83 inch interior envelope of the access door jams 
[Ref.  58]. 
  Rationale: Arms rooms are the only common certified sensitive item 
storage areas within Army tactical units.  To prevent expensive 
construction modifications, sensitive item storage systems must be able to 
fit within this constraint. 
The following are the IPT’s requirement recommendations for the missions and 
the environments where the secure storage system must operate.  
• The secure storage system will be capable of operating in all U.S. Army 
operational and training missions, both in peacetime and in time of war, 
but will be optimized for Stability and Support Operations (SASO). 
  Rationale:  The system will be optimized for SASO since the system is 
most likely to be used in this mission profile.  Stability and Support 
Operations are characterized by deployments of long duration, in static 
positions, where soldiers often conduct duty in shifts throughout the day 
and have a storage requirement for their weapons during off-shift periods.  
Soldiers on deployment in higher intensity conflicts generally keep their 
weapons and equipment on their person and are ready for rapid 
movement; therefore, this type mission limits (but does not necessarily 
eliminate) the need for a forward-deployed security system. 
• The secure storage system or its major components will be used both at 
home station and upon deployment. 
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  Rationale:  To achieve the cost and performance synergies of a total 
system, it only makes sense to use the same system, or major components 
thereof, across the full spectrum of possible uses. 
• The secure storage system must be an “all weather” system capable of 
operating in all environmental conditions including arctic, tropical, desert, 
and all environments in between.  It must have overhead protection from 
environmental conditions when internal storage systems are in use. 
  Rationale:  The Army is an “all weather force” and it must be prepared to 
conduct operations wherever called, regardless of weather conditions.  To 
prevent corrosion or damage, all items in storage must be protected from 
precipitation, even when in operational use.  
• The secure storage system must be located so as to be easily available and 
accessible to the owning commander who is signed for both the system 
and its contents. 
  Rationale: Due to the importance of the sensitive items and valued non-
sensitive items contained within a secure storage system, these items must 
be readily available to the commander for both training as well as rapid 
deployment.  Additionally, the serious consequences associated with the 
loss of any such items from the storage system makes it paramount that 
the system, or its major components, be in close physical proximity to the 
owning commander’s administration area to ensure the proper level of 
security and oversight. 
The following are the IPT’s functional requirement recommendations for the 
secure storage system. 
• The system must support all sensitive items and valued non-sensitive 
items normally encountered at Brigade-level and below and be capable of 
sufficient expansion capacity to meet the unit’s secure storage needs over 
the next 20 years.  The physically largest sensitive items that the system is 
currently expected to support will be the M2 machine gun, the Mk.19 
automatic grenade launcher, the Javelin Command Launch Unit (CLU), 
and the TOW Missile Improved Target and Acquisition System sight. 
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  Rationale: The system must be able to handle all items that are currently a 
security concern, and have sufficient capacity to handle the likely 
increased storage needs of future sensitive item systems. 
• The system must reduce the cubic space that current storage methods 
require within existing facilities. 
  Rationale: In order to minimize facility modifications and/or military 
construction (MILCON), existing secure storage within present facilities 
should be utilized to the maximum extent possible.  To have sufficient 
capacity for future expansion, the current storage footprint must be 
reduced or these facilities will not be able to accommodate the larger 
future storage requirement.  Additionally, savings in the cubic area 
consumed by the system ensures less logistical effort to transport it into 
theater and throughout the area of operations 
• The system’s components will fit within a standard arms room while in 
garrison to meet existing sensitive item security regulations.  Its 
construction must be sufficiently robust to be approved for sensitive item 
storage during transport while under the watch of a security escort.   
  Rationale: System must meet physical security standards and procedures 
for arms and sensitive items in accordance with Army Regulations 190-11, 
190-13, 190-51, and Field Manual 55-65.   
• The system must be capable of being fitted with an Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS) to be installed primarily for long-term field usage.   
  Rationale: An IDS system will enable the system to be left unsupervised, 
thereby conserving manpower in the field. 
• The system will be automated with information technology to assist and 
enhance the accountability, issue, and receipt of equipment contained 
within.  Additionally, maintenance actions and records concerning the 
system’s contents will be automated as well.    
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  Rationale:  All inventory, issue, and receipt actions involving sensitive and 
valued non-sensitive items are extremely time consuming and are 
currently done manually.  Any improvement would allow considerable 
time savings for soldiers and the administrating headquarters.  
Additionally, most maintenance administrative actions are currently done 
manually which also takes considerable time.  
• The system will be able to accept multiple storage configurations to 
accommodate different units’ various types of equipment while 
maintaining overall standardized form, fit, and function within a 
deployable platform.  Units will be able to cross-load their equipment with 
other units storage systems with the assurance of a separate and secure 
environment within the overall storage system, thus preventing 
intermingling of the different units’ equipment. 
  Rationale: The system will be expected to handle a multitude of 
equipment types since all units have different equipment and have 
different storage requirements.  All equipment must be pre-configured and 
organized to facilitate rapid loading and subsequent deployment.  Army 
units routinely attach or assign supporting units to other elements and they 
must be able to rapidly insert their equipment into their new parent 
organization’s secure storage system without concern for confusing their 
equipment with the parent unit’s.   
• The fully loaded system must be compatible with, and be transported by, 
unmodified 5-ton cargo trucks as a minimum.   Transportation via 2.5-ton 
trucks is desirable.  Short-range transportation over primary roads via a 
dolly set is also desirable. 
  Rationale:  To maximize the transportation flexibility of a division, 
existing transportation assets common to combat arms and combat support 
battalions must be used.   Dolly sets provide wheels for a container and 
enable the containers to be towed without the need for a large prime 
mover. 
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• Internal components of system used within the arms room must be able to 
be moved about the arms room and the company area by hand or via 
human-powered mechanical material handling equipment.  
  Rationale: The Army’s smallest forklift, the 4000-pound model, is unable 
to enter and operate within current company storage areas. Additionally, 
the purchase of even smaller motorized MHE is discouraged due to the 
additional acquisition and support costs involved.   
• The system must have the ability to employ a worldwide movement 
tracking system, if so desired.  As a minimum, the container must have a 
system for remotely locating the container and identifying its contents at 
the point of embarkation and debarkation. 
  Rationale:  Transportation of sensitive items is even more secure when the 
items can be tracked during transport.  Additionally, a movement tracking 
system will provide visibility of the storage unit and its contents 
throughout its travels.  A container locating system enables the owning or 
responsible unit to rapidly locate the storage system at the critical points of 
embarkation and debarkation.  
• The system must provide ease of accessibility to all its contents without 
the need to unload any portion of the system to gain access to otherwise 
unreachable areas.  Additionally, the storage system must maximize its 
available interior space. 
  Rationale:  Current “breakbulk” deployable storage systems require 
repeated unloading and loading to gain access to the entirety of the stored 
items, as such systems lack any organizational structure to manage interior 
storage; consequently, much time is wasted in such pursuits.   
Additionally, traditional stuffing measures leave much wasted interior 
storage space and are prone to shifting during transport 
• The system will require extremely limited blocking, bracing, or banding 
when fully loaded. 
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  Rationale:  Much time, effort, and non-organic resources are required for a 
unit to block, brace, and band current deployable storage containers to 
prevent their contents from shifting during transport.   Additionally, since 
the average combat arms and combat support unit is not extensively 
trained in container loading/stuffing operations, their blocking and bracing 
efforts may be substandard. 
• The system should be able to replace the majority of existing, individual, 
protective storage cases for sensitive and valued non-sensitive items.  
  Rationale:  Most sensitive and valued non-sensitive items are issued with 
their own protective storage cases, which when stored in bulk create 
storage problems due to their large size in respect to the actual item being 
protected.  The proposed secure storage system should provide enough 
impact protection to make the continued use of such cases unnecessary, 
thus saving considerable storage space. 
• The system will have components common to both early entry forces and 
heavier mechanized or armored forces. 
  Rationale:  Commonality across the Army will increase the system’s 
utility and affordability as well as enabling all types of forces to store their 
equipment in one another’s storage system if this need ever arose.  
• The system will have sufficient flexibility to store existing small arms and 
crew-served weapons with their various sighting/aiming systems and 
MILES transmitters attached or mounted.  Additionally, the system must 
be able to accommodate future arms such as the Objective Individual 
Combat Weapon (OICW) and its Crew-Served counterpart (OCSW) 
without significant modification. 
  Rationale:  Current arms racks can limit the amount and type of 
sighting/aiming systems that can be stored mounted on the weapons 
requiring their removal prior to storing.  Additionally, modifications have 
to currently be made to accommodate the small differences between the 
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M16 and the M4 Carbine storage racks, and new generations of weapons 
will require totally new storage racks.  It makes sense to try to 
accommodate all within the same storage system envelope to prevent 
continued modifications and new procurements of weapons racks. 
• The system will have a portable workspace and tool storage for the unit 
armorer. 
  Rationale: Although the armorer has a standard toolkit, he/she has no 
standard workspace.  The armorer typically fabricates such a workbench 
in garrison, which is rarely transportable to a field environment where it is 
needed as much or more since that is the location of the majority of 
weapons malfunctions. 
• The system will have openings and fixtures to accommodate intake and 
exhaust of Heating, Ventilation, Air Conditioning (HVAC), and a 
dehumidifier that do not compromise overall security. 
  Rationale:  Although an HVAC opening may not be necessary for 
common secure storage needs, it will increase the overall flexibility of the 
storage unit.  The dehumidifier is a necessity to prevent rusting of 
weapons and equipment in damp environments.  A direct drainage system 
will prevent the manual disposal of accumulated water. 
• The system must have connections for an external electrical power supply.  
There must also be auxiliary internal power outlets for other electrical 
appliances used within the system. 
  Rationale: Electrical power will be needed to operate such items as 
internal lights, an IDS, a dehumidifier, HVAC, and other unforeseen uses.    
• The system will have physically robust internal lighting fixtures.  
Connections to the light fixtures must have an automatic mechanism to 
select red light versus white during limited visibility.   
21 
  Rationale:  The system must use red light during tactical situations and 
periods of limited visibility to prevent easy visual identification by threat 
forces. 
The following requirements were not generated by the IPT, but were selected 
from an Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for an Authorized Stockage List 
Mobility System.  This system has some general similarities to the Secure Storage 
System.  These requirements are generic in nature but applicable and important for 
consideration for the secure storage system [Ref. 10]. 
• The system shall have high reliability and maintainability characteristics.  
The system must maintain a fully mission capable readiness status using 
he Army’s standard maintenance system.  Unit personnel will perform unit 
maintenance with organic tools. Unit level maintenance will consist of 
periodic inspection for mechanical integrity; lubrication; and maintenance 
of door assemblies, floor, roof, and sides.  Additionally, any internal 
storage systems must be robust, reliable, and able to be easily maintained.   
  Rationale:  As a container system, the secure storage system should have 
minimal maintenance requirements at the organizational and direct support 
(DS) maintenance levels.   
• The system will not create the need for additional operators or 
maintenance personnel. 
  Rationale: Conserves resources and limits life cycle costs. 
• The system design, to include controls, displays, configuration, required 
operating and maintenance procedures, and operating environment will 
minimize human performance errors, interface problems, and workload 
requirements.  The user interface should be uncomplicated and respect 
appropriate design guidance in MIL-STD-1472.  The system shall be 
designed for use by the 5th percentile female through the 95th percentile 
male soldier to promote ease of use.  The system must be compatible with 
the range of environmentally protective clothing. 
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  Rationale: The system must be easy to use for the majority of soldiers in 
various environments and conditions. 
• The system will be designed in accordance with all applicable system 
safety standards so as to minimize safety risks associated with operating 
and maintaining the system.  All safety hazards will be eliminated or 
reduced to an acceptable level of risk. 
Rationale: Safe operation is paramount. 
B. SECURITY STANDARDS 
1. Arms Storage Facilities 
Army Regulation 190-11 governs the physical security of U.S. Army arms, 
ammunition, and explosives.  The totality of this section is drawn from that regulation.  
However, this research is primarily concerned with the security of arms, as the Army 
typically does not store bulk ammunition or explosives within a tactical unit.  The Army 
classifies its arms into four storage risk categories [Ref. 11]:   
• Category I includes complete, ready-to-fire, man portable missiles and 
rockets.  An AT-4 anti-armor weapon is an example, as is a fully 
configured Javelin missile.  As with ammunition and explosives, such 
items are not typically stored within a tactical unit’s facilities.   
• Category II is the highest security storage category commonly 
encountered.  It includes such weapons as light, medium, and some heavy 
small arms and crew served weapons.  The M249 SAW, the M240 MG, 
the M16/M4 serious of weapons, the M2 .50 caliber MG, and the Mk.19 
40mm Automatic Grenade Launcher are all in this category. 
• Category III includes such weapons as all non-ready to fire missile or 
rocket launch tubes and their separate firing assemblies, mortar tubes, and 
grenade launchers. 
• Category IV includes all non-fully automatic shoulder-fired small arms 
and handguns. 
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All risk categories require a fixed facility secure storage area whose construction 
is specified by the AR 190-11.  For this research, all previous or future construction of 
fixed, secure facilities meets these requirements.  The requirements for security of arms 
within the fixed secure facility are as follows [Ref. 12]: 
• When not in use, arms will be stored in banded crates, metal containers, 
approved standard issue racks or locally fabricated racks.  Fabricated racks 
will provide, at a minimum, security equivalent to standard issue racks.  
Standard issue approved metal wall lockers or metal cabinets may be used.  
Crates or containers will be banded, locked, or sealed in a way that will 
prevent weapon removal without leaving visible signs of tampering.  
Screws or bolts used in assembly of racks, crates, or containers will be 
made secure to prevent disassembly.   
• All arms racks or container will be locked with approved secondary 
padlocks.   All racks or containers must ensure that weapons cannot be 
disassembled within the rack or container and subsequently removed. 
• In facilities not manned 24 hours a day, all racks or containers weighing 
less than 500 pounds must be secured to the structure or fastened together 
in groups totaling more than 500 pounds with bolts or chains equipped 
with secondary padlocks 
The security features or characteristics that must be included in secure storage that 
does not meet fixed facility security standards, yet where a comparative level of security 
is desired, must include the following [Ref. 13]: 
• Category II-IV arms must be stored in a General Services Administration 
(GSA) approved, Class 5 security container such as a safe-type filing 
cabinet, or a modular steel vault that does not contain classified documents 
or materials.  A Class 5 security container must provide a minimum of 15 
minutes of protection against a multilevel tool attack [Ref. 14]. 
• An approved intruder detection system (IDS) must be present and a 
security patrol must check the facility at least every 8 hours.  Without the 
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IDS the facility must be guarded 24 hours a day by an armed sentry if it 
contains Category II arms.   With Category III and IV arms only constant 
surveillance is required if there is no IDS.  The IDS includes both interior 
and exterior detection systems that report directly to an alarm monitoring 
station.   
• Arms racks or containers will be locked with approved secondary 
padlocks.  All racks or containers must ensure that weapons cannot be 
disassembled within the rack or container and subsequently removed. 
• In facilities not manned 24 hours a day, all racks or containers weighing 
less than 500 pounds must be secured to the structure or fastened together 
in groups totaling more than 500 pounds with bolts or chains equipped 
with secondary padlocks 
• Access doors must have approved high security locking devices.  The 
most secure door in systems with double-door protection will utilize the 
most secure lock. 
• When mobile containers are used their vulnerability must be assessed and 
they must be placed where they are least likely to be able to be moved by 
unauthorized persons with heavy lifting equipment. 
2. Arms In Transit  
Arms can either be securely transported by their unit or via civilian contractors.  
The standards for the transportation of arms by their unit follow [Ref. 15]: 
• Categories I and II arms will be placed in the custody of a commissioned 
officer, warrant officer, noncommissioned officer (E-5 and above), or a 
DoD civilian (GS-5 and above). 
• Category I arms will be provided armed guard surveillance.  Category II 
arms will be provided armed guard surveillance provided State or 
territorial law does not prohibit the arming of the guards, and then a 
waiver for such a policy will be requested. 
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• Bulk shipments of arms will be placed in approved shipping containers, 
for example CONEX, MILVAN, and SEAVAN.  The container must be 
secured with approved locks.  Containers will be placed door-to-door or 
door-to-immovable object to prevent unauthorized entry. 
• A detailed packing list and serial number inventory will be placed within 
the container for inventory purposes. 
Security standards for the transportation of Category II arms and below by 
civilian contractors follow [Ref. 16]: 
• Via ground transport 
- Exclusive use of vehicle 
- Satellite motor surveillance service  
- Dual driver protective service with national agency check 
- Locked and sealed by contracted shipper 
- Single line-haul required 
• Via rail transport 
- Rail surveillance system 
- Military traffic expediting service 
- Locked and sealed by shipper 
- Immediate notification of consignee upon delivery 
- For flatcar transport use only approved shipping containers, for 
example CONEX, MILVAN, and SEAVAN.  The container must be 
secured with approved locks.  Containers will be placed door-to-door 





• Via air transport 
- DoD constant surveillance system 
- Shipper escort to the carrier and immediate pickup at the point of 
destination. 
- Container banded or locked  
- Seals applied by shipper 
• Via water transport 
- Pier service only 
- Written receipt from ship’s officer at port of embarkation and written 
release to carrier at port of debarkation 
3. Unclassified Sensitive and Valued Non-sensitive Item Storage 
Facilities 
The level of security of unclassified sensitive and valued non-sensitive items is 
based on a risk analysis dictated by DA Form 7278-R and DA Pamphlet 190-51 and 
conducted by representatives of the installation commander, the using unit, and the 
supporting provost marshal (military police authority) [Ref. 17].  This risk assessment 
weighs the mission criticality, replaceability, and relative value of the item and compares 
this to the relative sophistication of the threat and the likelihood the threat will pursue a 
given course of action. The three risk levels run from I to III with Risk level III being the 
highest of the three.  This risk assessment must be done when a unit is activated, when it 
relocates to a new site or facility, at least every 3 years, or when an incident occurs in 
which an asset is compromised.  The primary sensitive and valued non-sensitive items a 
tactical unit might be most concerned about would be communications equipment; night 
vision devices; secondary weapon sights, nuclear, biological, chemical detection devices, 
equipment parts and spares in the authorized prescribed load list (PLL); and unkeyed 
controlled cryptographic items (CCI).  For this research the standards for risk level III 
must be achieved since the system will be mobile and thus could be used in the worst-
case scenario.  These standards include [Ref. 18]: 
27 
• Portable items must have double barrier protection.  Examples of double 
barrier protection would be a locked steel cage or a free-standing locked 
container within a secure storage structure.  Additionally, securely affixing 
the item to the internal structure of a secure storage structure meets the 
double barrier standard. 
• Portable and easily pilfered items must be stored in a separate locked 
secure room, area, or container with controlled access. 
• There area must be lighted during hours of darkness. 
• No landscaping features greater than 12 inches high that may give 
concealment are allowed with 20 feet of the facility 
• An IDS will be installed around or on the storage room, area, or container. 
4. Unclassified Sensitive and Valued Non-sensitive Items In-transit 
Army Regulation 190-51, Security of Unclassified Army Property (Sensitive and 
Non-sensitive) does not include information on transporting sensitive and non-sensitive 
items; however, it does mention the in-transit security of controlled medical substances 
and other medically sensitive items.    It says, “In-transit security must be such that the 
spirit and intent of this regulation are not violated and that these sensitive items are 
protected from unauthorized possessions, use, and theft.”  The same standard would seem 
to reasonably apply to the full array of unclassified sensitive and valued non-sensitive 
items [Ref. 19].                                                                                                                                                    
C. TRANSPORTATION CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Intermodal Transport Compatibility 
One of the key requirements for the secure storage system is that it be mobile.  It 
must be able to be deployed to major training exercises and contingency operations as 
rapidly and efficiently as possible.  Since the secure storage system could feasibly move 
via road, rail, sea, or air a review of intermodal systems is required to ensure 
compatibility of the system with established commercial and military transportation 
systems.    
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Intermodalism is the transshipping of cargo among two or more modes of 
transportation.  In concert with intermodalism, containerization facilitates and optimizes 
carrying cargo via multiple modes of transport (sea, highway, rail, and air) without 
intermediate handling of contents” [Ref. 20].   Intermodal capability and containerization 
is important to DoD as the effective implementation of both increases the seamless flow 
of materials and information; mobility and readiness; throughput distribution; 
standardization; in-transit visibility; and cargo integrity, security, and safety [Ref. 21].  
These characteristics greatly increase the responsiveness of U.S. forces and enable rapid 
power projection through the use of both DoD and commercial transportation assets.   
 The overarching policy for DoD intermodal containerization comes from DoD 
Regulation 4500.9-R-1.  It says that DoD components shall: 
• Establish container-oriented distribution systems 
• Use such systems to move supplies and equipment 
• Use commercial industry 
• Ensure system interoperability 
Even without such a policy, the U.S. Army’s new vision of “Transformation” 
would seem to be quite impossible without the effective use of commercial shipping.  
Although the Army’s Chief of Staff demands that a combat Brigade be deployed in-
theater within 96 hours and a Division within 120 hours, the bulk of such early Brigade 
deployments would be accomplished primarily through air transport.  However, there is a 
final requirement to have five Divisions deployed within 30 days [Ref. 22], which would 
be quite impossible without the use of commercial sealift.  There is just not enough Air 
Force or commercial air capacity available to accomplish such a Herculean task.  Since 
the Army has the largest requirement of all services for strategic lift, it must maximize its 
use of containerization to facilitate rapid deployment - especially through the use of 
sealift.  The Army must look towards commercial shipping to meet its deployment needs, 
as this is the primary transportation variable that has changed since DESERT STORM – 
largely due to the advent of the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA).  VISA 
provides the DoD with a modern, efficient, and capable intermodal transportation 
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network through pre-negotiated contracts with U.S. shipping companies [Ref. 23].  As a 
result, there has been a 134% increase in sealift capacity since DESERT STORM while 
airlift capacity has increased a mere 2% [Ref. 24].    
The U.S. Army’s Field Manual for container operations, FM 55-80, dated 13 
AUG 1997, stresses, “Containerization increases the types of ships available to support 
strategic deployment as well as increasing the cargo capacity of other available ships. It 
also streamlines handling requirements within the distribution system, increases 
protections against shipping damage, and safeguards against pilferage.”  The manual goes 
on to say, “The Army’s goal is to increase the use of containers to improve the use of 
strategic lift and improve force closure for unit equipment and sustainment supplies.  The 
Army must adopt a container system that is interoperable with both Service components 
and commercial industry” [Ref. 25].  In effect, the official publications mandate that if 
the Army desires to move cargo like the rest of the world, it must adopt commercial 
containerization practices to the greatest practical degree. 
Two basic types of systems characterize intermodal containers.  The first is a 
commercial system known as the American National Standards Institute/International 
Organization for Standardization (ANSI/(ISO) container systems - from hereon to be 
known simply as ISO containers.  The second is a U.S. Air Force system, the 463L Air 
Transport System.   
Most ISO containers (frequently known in the military as CONEXs, MILVANs or 
SEAVANs) have square, boxlike configurations to promote ease of stacking within ships 
or on shore, and are standardized at their width – all being 8 feet wide.  The other primary 
standardization feature is the “twist lock” connection fitting on all corners of the 
container.  This common connector interface allows the container to be firmly grasped by 
a wide array of material handling equipment (MHE), enables containers to be adjoined to 
one another, and also locks them onto transportation assets (towed container chassis, rail 
car, etc.).   
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Figure 2. ANSI/ISO Container [From Ref. 26] 
 








































Max Gross Weight 52,900 lbs 67,200 lbs 
* Maximum height is external height minus 9.5”  
Table 1.   ISO Dimensions [From Ref. 27] 
   
The DoD uses two standard lengths for its ISO containers, 40 and 20-foot 
units.  The 20-foot (actually only 19 feet, 11 inches long to enable two to be joined to 
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make a 40-foot unit) unit is the preferred container for the full continuum of DoD 
container operations as it fits the widest array of MHE and transport mediums; 
however, the 40-foot unit is typically more economical to ship, costing an average of 
only 10% more to ship via commercial carrier than a 20-foot unit. (Ref. Joint 
Intermodal Working Group Brief).  The DoD’s stated goal is to ship unit equipment 
primarily in 20-foot containers and sustainment supplies in both 20 and 40-foot ISO 
containers [Ref. 28].  It should be noted that there are ISO containers that are smaller 
than 20-foot units, but they typically can be configured in Twenty-foot Equivalent 
Units (TEU).  For instance, the Army has a few “TRICON” and “QUADCON” 
containers that when three or four respectively are joined together using connectors on 
their corner fittings, they essentially become one TEU.     
 
Figure 3.  TRICON and QUADCON Containers [From Ref. 29] 
 
The Army has a preference for the TEU.  In fact, during a recent operation in 
the Balkan area of operations, a Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe message mandated 
that all container shipments be configured and shipped in 20-foot containers as the theater 
was unable to receive, stage, or provide onward integration of 40-foot containers due 
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severe limitations of cargo handling equipment [Ref. 30].  This preference for the shorter 
container is primarily a result of the Army’s standardized artillery ammunition and rocket 
resupply system, which uses this size of container exclusively on its Palletized Loading 
System (PLS) trucks for rapid loading, unloading, and movement.   
The commercial shipping industry has a preference for 40-foot and longer 
containers, as these tend to offer the greatest overall efficiencies.  Consequently 20-foot 
containers now make up only about 23% of the available commercial container pool. 
Additionally, although 23% of all containers would seem to be a large number, the pools 
of 20-footers are not evenly spread throughout the world, leaving the potential for severe 
regional shortages being created shortages during deployment surges [Ref. 30].   Lastly, it 
takes, on average, seven days to request and receive commercially leased containers [Ref. 
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One last characteristic of ISO containers that should be highlighted is that they 
are heavy.  An average commercial 20-footer will average between 3,800 and 5,555 
pounds [Ref. 32].  Such a healthy weight considerably limits the container system’s 
maneuverability and mandates robust MHE and transportation assets at all levels. 
2. Air Transport Compatibility 
As mentioned above, air transport constitutes one of the legs of intermodalism, 
yet it is the most restrictive due to aircraft payload limitations on weight and size.  
Additionally, there are a very limited number of cargo aircraft available to U.S. military 
forces as compared to other intermodal transportation options.   
Despite these limitations, air transport does provide the most rapid means of 
deployment; therefore, it is the method of choice for rapid movement of troops and 
equipment – typically in the early phases of operations.  The Army’s Transformation 
requirements demand that all future Army systems fit within the cargo-carrying envelope 
of the C-130 tactical cargo aircraft [Ref. 22].   The C-130 is a tactical aircraft versus a 
strategic air lifter in that it conducts most of its missions within a theater of operations 
rather than executing long flights to transport U.S.-based forces from CONUS to the 
theater of operations.  Thus the C-130 is a smaller and more flexible aircraft, able to land 
on relatively short and unimproved airstrips.  This capability is thought to be essential to 
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complement the new doctrine and the capabilities of the Army’s Interim Brigade Combat 
Teams and the subsequent Objective Force.  Of course anything that will fit into a C-130 
aircraft can more easily fit within larger Air Force cargo aircraft such as the C-141, C-5, 
and C-17, so universal compatibility is ensured.    
The U.S. Air Force has standardized method for loading, transporting, and 
unloading cargo within its aircraft: the 463L cargo system.  The 463L cargo system 
includes the pallets, nets, MHE, and aircraft rails and roller system.  The rails and rollers 
of the 463L system consists of rows of rollers and rails that allow the palletized cargo to 
be easily moved into the aircraft [Ref. 33].  The standard 463L pallet really appears to be 
no more than a thick, flat piece of aluminum with serrated edges - although it actually has 
a wood core sandwiched between the aluminum.  Almost any cargo under 10,000 pounds 
and 96 inches can be loaded onto the pallet as long as it can be contained and secured by 
the accompanying net system [Ref. 34 & 35].   
The other type of 463L compatible system is the Internal Airlift or Helicopter 
Sling-able Container Unit (ISU) that is essentially a rigid, six-sided 463L pallet.  
Typically these weatherproof containers will come in 60” or 90” heights and so are 
referenced as an ISU-60 or ISU-90 respectively.  The ISU, despite its similarity to a small 
ISO container, is much lighter and does not meet ISO structural standards so it cannot be 
stacked as ISO containers can.  This being the case, they cannot be moved on container 
ships unless carried as secondary loads or within a larger ISO container.  An additional 
feature of the ISU container is that it is certified for both internal and external (slingload) 
helicopter transport [Ref. 36].   
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Figure 4. ISU Containers [From Ref. 29] 
The user is ultimately responsible for building 463L pallets, not the Air Force, 
and may be responsible for loading them onto aircraft. Although the using units must 
purchase ISU containers, 463L pallets are available to units planning or executing an air 
movement (through their transportation office) from the U.S. Air Force Air Mobility 
Command [Ref. 37].  However, most rapidly deployable Army units maintain large 
stocks of these pallets on hand.  
It should be noted that standard ISO containers can indeed be utilized within Air 
Force cargo aircraft.  Even the 20 foot ISO container is capable of being transported via 
the C-130.  However, all ISO containers must first be placed on one or more 463L pallets 
before being loaded onto an aircraft [Ref. 37].  Conversely, ISU containers can fit within 
an ISO container if their height is limited to 83 inches (“shoe” and “slipper” concept).  If 
the ISU container is to be used in the container while mounted on a flatrack, the ISU can 
be no higher than 80 inches [Ref.  38].   
While the lighter ISU container is generally considered to be a tool of the Army’s 
light infantry, airborne, and air assault units, it has begun to be purchased by the forward 
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deployed mechanized and armored units in Europe, where transport via sealift is far less 
likely than CONUS based forces [Ref. 39].  
Lastly, the use of the ISU-90 for secure storage is not currently recommended.  It 
is not certified for such use and recent experience in the Balkan states reveal that ISU-90s 
were broken into extensively and their contents stolen, thus requiring 24-hour supervision 
by armed guards [Ref. 40].  However, a personal interview with a commander who 
served in the Balkans suggests that the primary failing of the ISU-90 is not with its slight 
construction, but rather with its lack of a high-security locking hasp to protect the 
standard 5200 series military padlocks used to secure the container.  This type of lock, 
left unprotected, is easily cut with standard bolt cutters [Ref. 41]. 
3. Ground Transportation Constraints     
Army Divisions do not have large quantities of medium or heavy transportation 
assets, nor do they have large quantities of material handling assets.  Instead, the Army 
relies on their higher echelons of support at Corps and Theater level for significant 
amounts of these resources.  Since many of these higher echelon support units are co-
located with the Divisional units at any given Army post, their availability to the Division 
during training and operations may be enhanced.  However, even the Army’s heaviest 
Divisions and their subordinate units have few assets able to efficiently lift and transport 
ISO containers, while Light Infantry, Airborne, and Air Assault Divisions have almost no 










Army Trucks Capable of Transporting 20-foot ISO Container 
Truck Type Cargo Weight Capacity Comments 
M1088A1 FMTV Tractor Towed load 
60,000 lbs 
• Transports containers on flat 
bed stake and platform trailer 
• Cannot self-load container 
• 103 flat bed trailers in 
DISCOM 
HEMTT Load Handling 
System (LHS) 
66,000 lbs • Specifically for handling 8’ x 
8’ x 20’ ISO containers and 
flatracks   
• Self-upload and download 
capability 
• C-130 transportable 
• Just being fielded 
Palletized Load System 
(PLS) 
88,000 lbs • Specifically for handling 8’ x 
8’ x 20’ ISO containers and 
flatracks  
• Self-upload and download 
capability 
• Primarily operated by 
Artillery units not support 
units. 54 in DIVARATY, 9 in 
DISCOM 
Table 2.   Army Trucks Capable of Transporting 20-foot ISO Container [From Ref. 42, 43, 
& 44] 
  
The best assets the heavy Division and the new Interim (medium) Brigades have 
for moving containerized cargo is the Palletized Loading System (PLS) and the Heavy 
Expanded-Mobility Tactical Truck – Load Handling System (HEMTT-LHS) trucks.  The 
PLS and LHS are tactical trucks and trailers with integral self-load and unload capability 
using demountable cargo beds (flatracks) or ISO type containers.  Both trucks have the 
same hydraulic load handling system that mechanically pulls the flatracks or container 
onto the system when loading.  ISO containers can either be mounted on one of the 
flatracks or a device called a Container Handling Unit (CHU) can be affixed to the end of 
any 20-foot ISO container.   
The PLS is primarily used as an ammunition supply system for Artillery units.  
Consequently, the Division Artillery has 54 of these systems compared to only 9 in the 
Division Support Command (based on a Division XXI Table of Organization and 
Equipment) [Ref. 44].  Thus, what appears to be an abundant MHE and transportation 
asset cannot be counted on to do logistical container work.   
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The LHS is just now being fielded to the Army.  Fortunately, it will primarily be 
fielded to combat service support units. 
 
Figure 5. HEMTT LHS with Trailer [From Ref. 43] 
 
    The most plentiful Division-level transportation assets are the 2.5 ton and 5 ton 
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicle (FMTV) trucks organic to the combat arms and 
combat support battalions in addition to the DISCOM.  Many of these trucks have their 
own Material Handling Crane (MHC) to facilitate self-loading. However, the new 
Division XXI table of organization (May 97) has taken most of the organic truck assets 
from the combat arms battalions and moved them to the DISCOM.  Combat arms 
battalions used to have support platoons with M977 or M985 cargo HEMTTs, which had 








 Common Modern Army Cargo Trucks 
Truck Type Cargo Weight Capacity Comments 
M1078A1 FMTV 2.5 ton 
Cargo 
5,000 lbs • Cargo bed 12.5’ x 7.5’ 
• 10 in Div XXI Infantry 
Heavy Combat Arms 
Battalion 
M1083A1 FMTV 5 ton 
Cargo 
10,000 lbs • Cargo bed 14’ x 7.5’ 
• None in Div XXI Infantry 
Heavy Combat Arms 
Battalion 
M1084A1 FMTV 5 ton 
Cargo w/ MHC 
10,000 lbs • Cargo bed 14’ x 7.5’ 
• MHC rated for 5000 lbs 
• 3 in Div XXI Infantry Heavy 
Combat Arms Battalion 
M977 HEMTT w/ MHC 62,000 lbs • Cargo bed 18’ x 8’ 
• MHC rated at 2500 lbs 
• None in Div XXI Infantry 
Heavy Combat Arms 
Battalion 
M985 HEMTT w/MHC 68,000 lbs • Cargo bed 18’ x 8’ 
• MHC rated at 5400 lbs 
• 99 total cargo HEMTTs in 
DISCOM 
• None in Div XXI Infantry 
Heavy Combat Arms 
Battalion 
 
Table 3.   Common Modern Army Cargo Trucks [From Ref. 42, 43, & 44] 
 
The bulk of the MHE available to the Force XXI Division consists of various 
forklifts and cranes belonging primarily to the Division Support Command (see Table 4).  
Unfortunately, such MHE is almost totally absent from ground maneuver combat 
brigades.  Additionally, the Division does not own any forklifts capable of lifting a 







 Common Army Material Handling Equipment 
MHE Type Lifting Capacity Comments 
4K Rough Terrain Forklift 4,000 lbs • Designed to stuff or unstuff 
containerized cargo 
• Deployable within 20-foot 
container 
• 10 in DISCOM 
6K Variable Reach Forklift 6,000 lbs • Boom can extend to 21 feet 
• Cross-country mobility 
• 21 in DISCOM 
10K Rough Terrain Forklift 10,000 lbs • 3 in DISCOM 
10K All Terrain Lifter 
Articulated System 
(ATLAS) 
10,000 lbs • Boom can extend to 21 feet 
• Cross-country mobility 
• Newest MHE in inventory 
• 8 in DISCOM, 5 in AVN 
BDE 
7.5-ton Crane w/ cab 15,000 lbs • 3 in DISCOM 
Rough Terrain Container 
Crane (RTCC) 
44,800 lbs 
@ 27-foot boom radius 
80,000 lbs 
@ 10-foot boom radius 
• Theater and Corps level asset 
• Largely being replaced by 
RTCH 
• Cross-country mobility 
Rough Terrain Container 
Handler (RTCH) 
53,000 lbs • Theater and Corps level asset 
• Can lift and transport 20-foot 
and 40-foot containers when 
equipped with top handler 
device 
• Cross-country mobility 
Container Handling Unit 
(CHU) 
36,250 lbs • Device that mounts on end of 
20-foot container and allows 
LHS or PLS to upload the 
container without a flatrack 
Table 4.   Common Army Material Handling Equipment [From Ref. 44 & 45] 
 
One remaining piece of MHE that should be mentioned is the Rough Terrain 
Container Handler (RTCH).  This large vehicle is used almost exclusively to lift and 
transport 20-foot ISO containers over short distances.  Although this is not a division 
asset, there is much discussion concerning adding it to the Division’s Table of 
Organization due to its extreme efficiency in moving containerized supplies and 





D.   MARKET SURVEY 
Surveying government and commercial storage systems is a prudent step in 
developing an affordable and innovative secure storage design.  The requirement for a 
mobile secure storage system has been valid for quite some time and ad hoc measures 
have been undertaken to meet the requirement for the most part.  However, industry has 
begun to respond to this requirement and there are several companies who currently 
market some form of containerized secure storage system. 
1. Secure Storage Methods used During Recent Deployments  
As a precursor to surveying the commercial market it is worth examining the 
typical U.S. Army ad hoc secure storage remedy used during recent stability and support 
operations.  The following information concerning improvised secure storage is based on 
input from personal statements from officers participating in stability operations from 
Haiti to Kosovo.  
 By far the most common method used for creating a field expedient secure 
storage facility when no fixed facilities are available or adequate, is the placement of 
weapons and secure items within dry cargo ISO intermodal containers or within ISU 
containers.  This usually involves removing the small arms racks used in the unit arms 
room, transporting them with the unit to the operational area, and then spot welding or 
chaining them into the interior of the container.  Once the racks are affixed, the arms can 
be placed in the racks and the container sealed and locked.  Additionally, it is common to 
see commercial grade lockable metal cabinets, such as the Stanley Vidmar brand, 
installed in such containers as well.  Although not suitable for arms security, these 
cabinets have sufficient security for many valued non-sensitive items.  Due to the lack of 
an IDS system, however, there must be an armed guard posted on this “secure” storage 
arrangement at all times, as simple bolt cutters can easily gain access to the container’s 
contents [Ref. 9].    
One clear advantage to this type of ad hoc system is the low cost. The average 
costs for a used (approximately 8 years old) 20-foot dry cargo ISO container is only 
$1,650, while a new container costs an average of $2,900.  The cost to lease an ISO 
container runs, on average, an extraordinarily low $1.33 per day [Ref. 47 & 48].  A plain 
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ISU container is a more expensive container alternative at $9,162 [Ref. 49].  Since the 
unit already owns the weapons racks there are no additional costs, except possibly for 
additional chains and locks. 
2. AAR Cadillac Manufacturing’s High Security Container 
AAR Cadillac Manufacturing, Cadillac, Michigan, is the lead manufacturer of the 
ISU type container.  After numerous requests for a container that could be used to store 
sensitive items, especially small arms, the company introduced their ISU-90I High 
Security Container (HSC) in 2001.  This container is a standard-size ISU-90, but is made 
of steel versus aluminum and balsa wood.  It is fitted with supplemental armor plate and 
uses high security hasps and padlocks on its door.  The concept for its interior storage 
mimics that of the ad hoc storage solution: standard weapons racks secured all around the 
interior walls of the container.  It also uses a rack mounted along the centerline of the 
container to accommodate even more weapons (see Figure 6).  This container can hold up 
to 300 M-16A2 rifles or 272 M-16A2s and 6 M-60 machine guns.  It is fitted with a 
power distribution system, interior electrical outlets and lights, a dehumidification 
system, and an optional security alarm system.  It currently lists for $65,409 [Ref. 49]. 
 




3.   BOH Environmental, LLC’s Field Pack-Up (FPU) System 
BOH Environmental, LLC of Chantilly, Virginia, calls its cargo system the Field 
Pack-Up (FPU) system. The FPU system uses a unique modular container system to 
enhance cargo organization, which subsequently creates large reductions in the cargo’s 
logistical footprint.  The basic system uses a 20-foot, side-opening, ISO-compatible 
container.  The container uses 10 modular cabinets that are loaded back to back into the 
container, and consume almost its entire interior space, thereby maximizing its utility.  
When installed in the side-opening container, these modules face outwards on both sides, 
thereby allowing full access to the entire contents of the container.  The modules also 
lock into the floor when mounted in the container, thereby eliminating the need for 
interior blocking and bracing.  They have a high security module that can hold up to 40 
M-16A2 rifles (see Figure 7) [Ref. 50]. 
   
Figure 7. Field Pack-Up System with High Security Module [From Ref. 50] 
 
The following is a brief summary of one units experiment with the FPU system.  
The 21st Theater Support Command’s 512th Supply Support Activity (SSA) conducted an 
evaluation of the FPU as a PLS-mobile warehouse to determine what efficiencies could 
be achieved through such a system.   
The 512th’s primary cargo utilized in this evaluation was their Authorized 
Stockage List (ASL), which consists of variety of classes of supply intended to replenish 
a brigade size unit.   The 512th SSA formerly carried their ASL in 4 M129 vans.  The 
M129 is a 30-foot long enclosed trailer pulled by a 5-ton tractor truck with a notoriously 
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poor reputation for both overall mechanical reliability and off-road mobility. In order to 
make the contents of such a container acceptably accessible, much empty space must be 
provided for a personnel walkway within the container’s interior.  By carefully repacking 
their ASL into the modular cabinets, the 512th found they were able to load 
approximately 81% of the contents of the four trailers into one 20-foot FPU while having 
100% accessibility to all their parts and supplies.  Another benefit was rapid upload and 
offload.  All the FPU’s modules could be loaded from a warehouse into the FPU within 
only 30 minutes with a 4000-pound forklift.  Lastly, the 512th discovered that almost no 
shifting of the modularized contents occurred when the FPU was transported in the field 
on the PLS truck during the evaluation [Ref. 40]. 
The FPU system does have a few negative features.  Chief among these is its 
system cost.  If 10 high security arms storage modules were purchased at their individual 
price of $13,793, the total system cost for the 20-foot FPU unit would exceed $160,000.  
(Ref. Ed Payne e-mail) Additionally, the units found that although the access to the 
contents of the container could not have been better, and its interior space was certainly 
maximized, the user and the pull-out drawers of the modules were exposed to the 
elements during use.  This occurs because access can only be gained from the exterior of 
the container [Ref. 40].  Lastly, units who had purchased the system found that the 
modules were too wide to fit through a standard arms room door [Ref. 51]. 
4.   Special Forces Weapons Transportation Container  
The 2nd Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group found their standard weapons racks 
inadequate for storage of their highly modified M4 Carbines.  In order for the weapons to 
fit within the existing racks, all sights and pointing devices had to first be removed.  
Additionally, they didn’t have any way to securely or easily transport their weapons 
during deployment.  They came up with the Weapons Transportation Container (WTC-1) 
manufactured by Reese Fabrication of Rockfish, North Carolina.  The WTC-1 is an 
aluminum safe with dimensions of 24” x 24” x 48” that weighs 116 pounds when empty.  
Although this small safe does not meet this thesis’ needs in terms of security, it does have 
some interesting features.  The WTC-1 is nicknamed “A-Team in a box” since it holds 
the entire weapons complement of a Special Forces A-Team: 12 M-4 carbines, 2 M-24 
sniper rifles, and 12 M-9 pistols, as well as the teams night vision goggles, radios, and 
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various other small equipment items.  The WTC-1’s internal weapon mounts are “bolt 
on” to provide ease of modification to accommodate a wider variety of weapons if 
required.  Additionally, the safe mounts removable wheels and a retractable handle for 
ease of transportation.  The WTC-1 costs an average of about $2,000 per unit [Ref. 4 & 










         
 
Figure 8. WTC-1 Special Forces Weapons Transportation Container [From Ref. 52] 
 
5. Automated Movement Tracking Systems 
It is certainly a goal of every logistician to have complete visibility of all assets in 
the supply chain.  So common is this goal that a variety of Automatic Identification 
Technologies (AIT) (bar codes, optical memory cards, radio frequency identification 
tags, satellite tracking, etc.) have been used in a variety of different systems at various 
levels of command in all the Services.  The Army’s most innovative and cutting edge 
AIT program is called the Movement Tracking System (MTS), which will provide near-
real-time data for in-transit visibility and velocity management of logistics and other 
Army combat support assets anywhere from the sustaining base to the theater of 
operations.  All supplies will move rapidly from the source, under positive control, 
through a distribution system, bypassing routine warehouse/storage functions, to the 
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combatant [Ref. 53]. This system will be physically installed on transportation assets 
rather than cargo containers; however, cargo assets can have radio frequency ID tags that 
will communicate with the satellite tracking system on the prime mover to provide true 
100% in-transit visibility of the cargo. 
     
Figure 9. Radio Frequency Tag and Handheld Reader [From Ref. 53] 
 
6.   Sensitive Item Marking System 
Another AIT of interest would be the Sensitive Item Marking System.  This is a 
recent initiative by the Army’s Logistics Integration Agency to create an automated arms 
room with commercial-off-the-shelf components. The system is made up of an individual 
soldier’s common access card, a handheld computer, and micro contact memory buttons 
affixed to the inventory items.  By simply touching the soldier’s smart card with the 
handheld computer’s wand and subsequently touching the memory button, the item is 
recorded as issued.  Receipt simply works in reverse.  Additionally, time-consuming 
serial number inventories can be a thing of the past, as the armorer only has to touch each 





Figure 10. Sensitive Item Marking System [From Ref. 54] 
 
7. Hydraulic Lift Casters 
A company named Tandemloc, Inc. of Havelock, North Carolina, has a 
unique product called Hydraulic Lift Caster (HLC).  These casters fit on the twist 
connection on each corner of the ISO container and enable two people to lift a 
70,000-pound container 13.5 inches by hand in only a few minutes.  Once 
installed The HLC can be used to move the container up to 15 mph over paved 
roads.  This device has great potential for short-range movement of containers 
when MHE or transportation is inadequate or unavailable.  The HLC unit price is 
$33,000 [Ref. 55]. 
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This chapter is a tailored systems engineering analysis.  Requirements and 
functions are analyzed and then synthesized into what the researcher believes to be the 
most effective and suitable secure storage system design.  This design is then analyzed to 
ensure it meets all required functions and satisfies the major system requirements. 
A. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
In Chapter III the user developed multiple requirements; however, exploring 
existing systems, regulations, facilities, and environments merged additional 
requirements.  Requirements Analysis is used to identify the important tasks that must be 
performed by the system.  This was done using a tailored analysis from the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) P1220 Requirements Analysis’ 15 Task 
Areas.  Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs), Measures of Performance (MOPs), 
constraints, functional requirements, interfaces, and operational scenarios where all 
considered.  Table 3 is the result of this analysis and is presented in a performance 
parameter format common to Operational Requirements Documents (ORD).  A 
“threshold” represents the minimum standard to which the system must perform, while 
“objective” represents the desired standard.  Systems meeting all threshold standards 
upon the completion of test and evaluation are typically designated as both operationally 
effective and operationally suitable.   
This list seeks to capture the major requirements within the limited scope of this 
thesis research.  Although lesser requirements do exist, and will ultimately influence the 








Major Performance Parameters Threshold (T) and Objective (O) 
Security Provide a minimum of 15 minutes of 
protection against a multi-level tool attack 
in garrison, during deployment, and upon 
deployment (T).  Meet minimum security 
regulations for unguarded operation in 
garrison and upon deployment (T). 
Loading Lift and load system components with 5-
ton FMTV material handling crane, or lift 
and load entire system with 10K forklift 
(T).  Lift and load entire system with 5-ton 
FMTV material handling crane, or lift and 
load entire system with 6K forklift (O).  
Require minimal blocking and/or bracing 
preparation (T).  Require no blocking 
and/or bracing preparation (O). 
Transportation Compatibility Deploy strategically by sea, rail, highway, 
and air to include all current USAF 
transport aircraft, C-130 and above (T).  
Ensure containers are ANSI/ISO 
compatible in terms of fittings, features, 
and dimensions, or ensure system is able to 
fit within an ISO container (T). Transport 
by 5-ton FMTV truck (T).  Transport by 
PLS and/or LHS trucks (O).  
Storage Space Reduction Reduce cubic storage space of arms, 
sensitive items, and valued non-sensitive 
items stored within existing company arms 
room by 30% (T), 50% (O). 
Require no new MILCON for secure 
facilities for 10 years (O). 
Storage Flexibility Store 95% of all current sensitive items 
and valued non-sensitive items within 
storage system (T).  Reconfigure internal 
equipment holding devices (e.g. racks and 
compartments) within storage space easily 
and economically to accommodate new or 
modified sensitive items (T). 
Automation  Improve equipment issue, receipt, and 
inventory processes by 50% (T), 75% (O). 
Provide automatic identification of system 
and system contents at debarkation site 
(T).   
Environment Operate system in all environmental and 
weather conditions (T). 
Table 5.   Performance Parameters  
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B. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
The purpose of Functional Analysis is to transform the functional, performance, 
interface and other requirements identified in the requirements analysis into a logical and 
understandable description of system functions that can assist with the design synthesis.  
By arranging functions in logical sequences, decomposing higher-level functions into 
lower-level functions, and allocating performance from higher to lower-level functions 
the researcher can better determine what the system must do, how well, and what 
constraints might limit the design [Ref. 56].  The following is a basic Functional Flow 
Block Diagram for the secure storage system decomposed to the second level. 
 








C. BEST SECURE STORAGE SYSTEM DESIGN SYNTHESIS 
After careful consideration of the available data the following system design will 
best meet the requirements for an Army Secure Storage System.  The system will be 
based upon two major elements: a TRICON type intermodal container and four, multi-
configurable, Class 5-level security modules to be stored within the TRICON container 
during deployment. 
1.   The TRICON Container 
The TRICON Container is a fully ANSI/ISO certified type intermodal container, 
which has already been purchased in limited quantities by the U.S. Army.  It is an 
extremely flexible design in that three TRICONs can easily be configured into a standard 
20-foot equivalent unit.  When adjoined, these three containers essentially have the 
functional characteristics of a side-opening 20-foot container.  This side-opening feature 
greatly increases the interior accessibility of the container, as access doors are available 
along its full length.  This is in contrast to most standard commercial containers that only 
open on one or both ends.   
The preferred design will have one major change over the standard TRICON: it 
will have an access door on each side, and these doors will be more robust and secure 
than current models.  Currently, standard ISO containers have external locking bars on 
each door that can be padlocked when the locking bars are in their fully closed positions.  
To ensure greater security than this external locking arrangement, the container door 
must have a locking system internal to the door or the surrounding frame.  For even 
greater security, the doors should have unexposed hinges, as external hinges are much 
easier to breach.  The padlocks used in the locking system should be contained within 
recessed pockets in the door or frame to protect the lock’s shackle from bolt cutters or 
saws.  By containing all locking and hinging mechanisms within the interior of the door 
or frame, the most common methods of invasion: cutting, sawing, and blunt force, are 
largely eliminated.  
An additional modification will consist of a locking interface installed on the floor 
of the TRICON to firmly secure the security modules to the container.  This interface will 
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prevent modules from shifting during transport and restrict the unwanted removal of the 
modules by unauthorized or threat personnel.  
Each TRICON will have a series of small access panels on each side of the 
container to enable several containers to be connected together via small ducts to share a 
variety of functions such as power, security system sensors, HVAC, and dehumidification 
systems.  All such systems that cannot fit within the limited space around the security 
modules will be mounted externally or configured to fit as a drawer insert into a security 
module.  By connecting multiple containers together to share such environmental and 
security systems, great monetary and space savings can be achieved. 
TRICON containers can either be stored at unit level or at installation level when 
not being used for secure storage. 






























Tare Weight 2,560 lbs 
Payload Weight 12,340 lbs 
Table 6.   TRICON Characteristics [From Ref. 57] 
 
2.   The Security Module 
The security module is the heart of the entire secure storage system.  The security 
module will be used within the company arms room as a replacement for all current 
weapons and sensitive item storage racks and cabinets.  Upon deployment the security 
module will be manually moved out of the unit arms room and four of these modules will 
be stored within the TRICON container.  The modular cabinets are loaded back to back 
into the container, and consume almost its entire interior space, thereby maximizing its 
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cargo utility.  When installed in the side-opening container, these modules face outwards 
on both sides, thereby allowing full access to the entire contents of the container. 
A critical constraint for the module is that it must easily fit through the 34-inch by 
83-inch interior doorframe of an arms room [Ref. 58].  It must also have a base that can 
accommodate forklift tines or pallet dolly roller tines as well.  Overall Module 
dimensions of 33 inches (width) by 80 inches (height) by 45 inches (depth) would allow 
for sufficient side clearance while allowing a pallet dolly to lift the module and roll it 
through doorways with sufficient overhead clearance.  Additionally, with a depth of 45 
inches, a full-length M-16A2 (39”) or OICW (33”) could be stored within the module 
horizontally, making weapons storage more efficient.  
The security module is similar to a current GSA-approved secure (1.75-inch thick 
steel walled) filing cabinet in that it is built to safe-like standards and has drawers.  The 
primary difference - and the key to its flexibility - is the ability to accommodate a variety 
of drawers of different depths within the same module.  With receptacles for a drawer 
mounted every four inches, an almost limitless combination of different drawer depths 
will be possible.  Each drawer will have customizable internal partitions to easily 
organize the items stored within.  These partitions will also prevent the contents from 
shifting within the drawer. 
Drawers used for weapons storage will typically hold the weapons horizontally.  
Each weapons drawer will be fitted with a commercial-grade, foam-type, protective insert 
that can be easily factory molded to fit any combination or configuration of weapon 
systems.   Of course these cheap molded inserts can be used to hold and protect other 
secure items where standard drawer partitions may be inappropriate. 
Each drawer will have a relatively thin, metal, lockable top cover that will 
essentially make each drawer secure unto itself.  This is the equivalent of having 
separately-locked arms racks.   
Instead of armoring the front of the drawers as in the current secure filing cabinet, 
a swinging armored door will fully enclose the front of the storage drawers.  A high-
security lock, with a protected hasp to prevent the cutting of its padlock’s shackle, will 
secure this door to complete the security envelope.  This door will have interior rubber 
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seals to protect the drawers from dust and moisture; however the door will include a 
closeable vent to be opened during extremely humid environments when a dehumidifier 
is operating within the system.    
3.   Other System Characteristics 
An Intruder Detection System (IDS) will have an installation space reserved 
above the security modules in the interior of the TRICON container.   Since the 
containers can be connected, and one IDS can support several TRICONs, it will be up to 
the unit to decide how many IDS systems are required to provide adequate security. 
Each container will have an internal lighting system installed that is both white 
and red light capable.  There will be an automatic light sensor to ensure only red lights 
are turned on during periods of darkness. 
Each container will have some type of retractable, overhead, protective awning or 
panel that can be pulled out to protect the user and the contents of the drawers from 
precipitation when the container and the module drawers are open. 
Each company will be issued a hand-operated pallet dolly as a system component.  
This dolly will provide an inexpensive and efficient means of transporting modules in 
and around the company area, and loading them into a ground mounted TRICON.  The 
pallet dolly must abide by the width constraints imposed by the arms room door. 
As part of the system, each installation will maintain from four to six  hydraulic 
lift caster sets with tow bar.  Since combat arms and combat support battalions have so 
little transportation and MHE assets, such a system component will provide an 
inexpensive solution for this serious shortcoming.  While the support battalions will focus 
on preparing the installation’s main effort for deployment, units selected as lower 
deployment priorities could be issued the HCLs to get an early start on moving their 
containerized equipment.  With the caster set, units can manage their own TRICONS into 
20-foot equivalent units and then tow them to their division’s railhead or truck ramp for 
outload with little or no assistance from the DISCOM.   
To further facilitate rapid outload, part of system fielding will include the addition 
of two RTCHs to each division-size installation.  This addition to the table of 
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organization and equipment will ensure all Army divisions and separate brigades have a 
robust and efficient container handling capability that will be necessary to support the 
increase in container operations that the secure storage system will require. 
The final system design feature is an AIT system to assist with managing 
inventories and maintenance actions.  Such a system should maximize commercial-off-
the-shelf (COTS) information technology components and be fully portable for use in 
garrison or when deployed.   As part of the complete AIT system, each storage system 
will be able to accommodate an RF tag, and each battalion will have an RF reading unit.  
The unit level inventory management system will export the internal inventory of the 
system to the RF tag.  This tag will then work in conjunction with satellite tracking 
systems mounted on transportation assets to monitor the container during deployment.  
The RF tag will then make it easy to locate the container upon debarkation, and to 
provide a list of its contents when queried. 
D.  DESIGN ANALYSIS 
1.   Security 
Since the TRICON container does not meet the structural standards of a Category 
II arms storage room or building, its interior modules must meet GSA approved Class 5 
security container standards.  If designed as above, the security modules should meet 
these security standards and regulations set forth in Chapter 4 of AR 190-11 Physical 
Security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives and Federal Specification AA-V-2737.   
However, since the design of the security modules differ somewhat from that of a GSA 
approved secure filing cabinet, the design will ultimately have to be approved by the 
GSA.   With the level of security these modules shall supply, as long as the storage 
system is equipped with an IDS system it should be able to be left unattended while only 
being checked by a security patrol once every 8 hours. 
Although the security modules will actually exceed security requirements as they 
sit within existing arms rooms, one major advantage of the system is that the modules can 
be used in non-secure structures or rooms as well.  If space within the arms room is 
exhausted, these modules can be placed into a non-secure structure or room (such as the 
supply room) and, as long as an IDS is installed within the space, they can be left there 
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unattended.   Based on the commander’s risk assessment, if the modules do not contain 
arms, but rather only other sensitive items and non-sensitive valued items, it may be quite 
possible to store such modules outside the arms room and not even require an IDS.   The 
ability of this mobile module to expand the secure characteristics of any existing structure 
makes it a great alternative to any military construction option. 
There is one security issue that cannot be addressed by the system.  During rail 
and truck transport intermodal containers carrying bulk arms shipments are required to be 
arranged door-to door on their transports so as to have their doors physically blocked to 
prevent them being opened in transit.  Since the system’s containers have dual doors, 
arranging them door-to-door still leaves exposed doors unless the transport platform 
comes equipped with fore and aft bulkheads.  However, since the design of the secure 
storage system’s doors is significantly more secure than those of current ISO containers, 
it is reasonable to believe that this requirement could be waived.   
2. Loading 
One of the primary reasons for selecting the TRICON container is due to its low 
tare weight and the general ability to “manhandle” it due to its relatively small size.   
These are both attributes that make it much easier for owning units to more easily lift and 
position it onto some mode of transportation.  Although the Forward Support Battalion 
has MHE assets that it will likely provide to its supported battalions, the pessimistic 
system designer would not count on such external support.   By ensuring that at least the 
system’s components can be individually lifted onto an organic 5-ton truck with its 
material handling crane and then assembled for movement, the unit is in much greater 
control of its destiny in transporting its secure items.  Additionally, when the Support 
Battalion does indeed provide its MHE assets to its supported units, the TRICON’s low 
tare weight leaves a greater opportunity to exploit the large numbers of 6K forklifts 
within the DISCOM – its most plentiful MHE asset [Ref. 44]. 
Another aspect of loading the container is preparing its contents from shifting 
during transport by blocking and bracing the contents.  Blocking and bracing is typically 
accomplished by using wood or other materials to make temporary internal walls within a 
container to prevent the contents from shifting.  Since the base of the modules lock into 
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the floor of the container in this system, there is no need for traditional blocking and 
bracing.  . 
3.   Transportation Compatibility 
The system’s greatest transportability strength is that it is compatible with all 
commercial and U.S. military intermodal systems.  However, since the selected system 
design is not immediately ready for air deployment, some analysis is needed to decide 
between this small ISO container and the air transportable ISU-type container.   With the 
Army’s new focus on rapidly deploying a wider range of forces via USAF aircraft, and 
with its large number of forward-based forces, the ISU container would seem to be a 
better platform.  However, a sustained air deployment is unrealistic as the numbers of 
aircraft are inadequate for the task.  The bulk of Army equipment will deploy by truck 
and rail from their home installations and then be transferred to Navy and commercial 
shipping assets to complete their journey overseas.   
Another deciding factor is that an ISU equipped unit faces difficult choices when 
it does not deploy by air.  Since ISU containers are not intermodal they must be either 
loaded onto intermodal flatracks or inside ISO containers if deployment by sea is decided 
upon.  Since units are unlikely to maintain these intermodal assets on hand, the units will 
have to wait for these containers to be rented and shipped to their installations.  And as 
the data in Chapter III indicates, circumstances can dictate the availability and adequacy 
of any given type of intermodal container.   By procuring an ISO container such as the 
TRICON as the deployment platform in the first place, there is no delay in preparing for 
deployment as all the container assets are already in place.   
Of course the opposite situation could occur as well: where the TRICON 
equipped unit may have to deploy by air.  First, the TRICON fits nicely upon a 463L 
pallet.  Second, 463L pallets are much more likely to be maintained by an installation 
since they are required for military air transport and are unavailable commercially. 
Additionally, these pallets are much more easily stored than ISO containers since they 
stack like plywood.  Even if they are not stored on the installation, the Air Force can 
provide them to make up for shortfalls.     
58 
Another plus for transportability is that three TRICON containers can be 
connected to form a 20-foot equivalent unit.  Thus, larger MHE assets such as PLS, LHS, 
and the RTCH, which routinely and easily move 20-foot units, can be taken advantage of 
to rapidly move multiple units where needed.   
4.   Storage Space Reduction 
The secure storage system has three major design features that create efficiencies 
in storage space and usage time.  First, the secure modules almost completely fill the 
interior of the system.   This design maximizes the internal space of the container, as a 
human does not need to walk inside the container to gain access to its contents.  Most ad-
hoc, and even professionally fabricated, secure storage designs use the concept of a 
portable room surrounded with interior weapons racks.  To gain access to the weapons, a 
person must physically walk into the room and select a weapon from one of the racks.  
By keeping the space open that is required for a human to move about within the room, 
up to one third or more of the available interior storage space is wasted.   
Second, the experiences of the aforementioned BOH Environmental, LLC, whose 
modular FPU had the greatest influence on this storage system design, reveals much 
about the efficiency of an organized, modular system.  Space savings of greater than fifty 
percent are almost always the case when a user organizes his/her equipment using 
modular storage units [Ref. 59].  By taking what is already in existing arms rooms, and 
reducing the storage footprint by fifty percent, one of the most pressing problems 
presented in this thesis: arms room overcrowding, is solved.   
Third, the TRICON’s interior length of 70 inches, height of 86.5 inches, and a 
depth of 90.5 inches, ensures that the four internal secure modules, measuring 33x80x45 
inches, minimize wasted space within the container while maximizing secure storage 
space.  This fact alone makes the ISU-type container a poorer choice for a modular 
platform since the constraints on the module’s size results in much wasted space within 
the larger ISU.  Additionally, since only two ISU containers can fit within a 20-foot ISO 
container (assuming 83-inch or shorter ISU containers are used), this means only eight 
security modules can be transported in the same deck space as three adjoined TRICONs 
- which can transport twelve modules.   Of course, the security modules will still easily 
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fit within an ISU, and a module-locking interface can certainly be developed for the ISU 
if this capability is desired. 
5. Storage Flexibility 
The secure module explanation section found above describes the flexible design 
features of the module drawers.  These drawers are truly the key to the flexibility of the 
security module as they can conform themselves to almost any stored item and are 
independent of any locking mechanism that might intrude into the drawer space.  
One of the greatest benefits of the security module’s drawer design is that it 
enables program managers and contractors to have a firm planning factor when 
determining the storage needs of their sensitive and valued non-sensitive items.  For 
example, the product manager for a new night vision goggle would know exactly what 
size drawer will fit his goggles, and how many of these drawers will be needed to 
accommodate the full contracted amount.  With this knowledge he can better judge his 
program support costs.  In another case, a laser site manufacturer who produces a site that 
mounts on the side of an M-4 carbine could assess the impacts of this modification on the 
space within one of the standard-size storage drawers.  He could then subcontract for a 
cheap foam drawer insert to accommodate the sites as they sit astride multiple M-4s in 
the drawer.   This new insert would be part of the contractors total support package for 
his site.   
6. Automation 
Inventory management of weapons and other sensitive items is pure drudgery for 
those executing the task.  By automating the processes involved, significant time savings 
can be achieved.  This will allow the armorer to concentrate on other pressing tasks such 
as maintenance.  Such automated inventory management systems are likely to leave the 
physical security inspectors a bit concerned, but the technologies involved have been 
proven by many commercial applications over time and should serve the military well. 
  Radio frequency tags are the solution to the Desert Storm quandary where 
mountains of stored equipment completely lost their visibility to the logistics managers.  
These tags, working in conjunction with worldwide satellite tracking systems, will finally 
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bring total asset visibility to the supply chain.  As such it is essential they be included as 
part of each system. 
7. Environment 
The secure storage system, when closed, is almost totally resistant to all 
environmental conditions.  However, when it is open and being utilized, its drawers are 
largely exposed to the elements when they are withdrawn from their modules.  This being 
the case, a retractable awning must be an element of the design.  A rigid panel could be 
suspended from the top of the interior of the container and be withdrawn when needed, or 
a retractable fabric awning could be mounted externally to the container.  Regardless of 
which awning design proves to be optimal, the addition of such a protective device is a 
must. 
8. Cost  
Since no hard data exists on this system design, cost can be determined only on a 
rough order of magnitude.  This thesis does not seek to use system cost as a design 
consideration; however, the consideration of cost will be unavoidable in an actual 
acquisition program.  This being the case, the following calculations were derived for 
comparative purposes to get a feel for how the system might compare to commercial 
alternatives.   
A TRICON intermodal container costs $2,789 at an estimated division level 
quantity of 210 units [Ref. 6].  Expect a price increase of 30% to incorporate the newly 
designed doors and interior features such as lights and power connections.  This brings 
the price to $3,626.  Since the security module is a unique design, no cost data is 
available; however, the FPU module is quite similar.  Even so, their $13,793 price per 
module seems a bit excessive.  The price for a quantity buy in a competitive environment 
would likely fall between ½ and ¾ of this price, or $8,620.   Consequently, the final price 
for a complete secure storage system would be near $38,106 per unit.  The cost for a 20-
foot equivalent unit (3 systems) would add to $114,318 – about $45,000 less than the 20-
foot FPU system - but with 2 more storage modules than the FPU.  The total cost for a 
division-size buy would come to $8,002,260 just for the container system.  This does not 
include system level costs such as pallet dollies, hydraulic casters, and the two RTCHs. 
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E.  TRACEABILITY MATRICES 
The following matrices are a graphic tool to demonstrate that design synthesis has 
resulted in a physical architecture that meets the requirements of the seven major 
performance parameters.  This measure completes the Verification Loop of the SEP. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this chapter the primary and subsidiary research questions are examined and 
conclusions are presented.  In addition, recommendations for future actions are offered. 
A. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION 
What is a system design that can provide the Army with security, protected 
storage, availability, and accountability of sensitive and valued non-sensitive items and 
equipment in garrison, during strategic deployment, and when deployed for training and 
operations?   
Based on this tailored systems engineering analysis it is apparent that a design 
that is both modular and intermodal best satisfies the present and future requirements of a 
U.S. Army secure storage system.   However, this primary research question is more 
completely addressed by the responses to the four subsidiary research questions.  The 
conclusions to these research questions and the accompanying recommendations are 
presented below. 
B. FIRST SUBSIDIARY QUESTION 
What features and performance levels will the system’s users require?   
1. Conclusions 
Regardless of the reasonable and studied visions of system designers, the user 
provides critical insight into the features and performance levels of the system, and thus 
must be included in the system design process from its earliest inception.  Even the 
rudimentary nature of the input gathered from “users” for this research, radically 
influenced its design.  For example, early studies conducted by the Army Corps of 
Engineers examining the secure storage issue depicted an installation-level centralized 
storage annex.  The users flatly rejected this centralized design concept in favor of 
utilizing existing facilities.  These existing facilities were important to the user as they 
provide the commander with the desired amount of control and administration over 
mission critical sensitive items.  This decision in turn mandated that the design optimize 
the storage space within the existing arms rooms to allow for their continued use.  Super-
organized security modules were the result of this need.  Subsequently, the constraints of 
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the existing arms rooms (the doors) restricted the dimensions of the security modules, 
which, in turn, influenced the container type selected to house the entire system.  
Ultimately, the users provided input that resulted in reconfigurable storage containers, 
greater transportation compatibility, manual transportation methods (hand dollies), 
HVAC access capability, electrical wiring and lighting recommendations, and an end to 
blocking and bracing procedures 
2. Recommendations 
Future studies and design analyses should include input from a robust sample of 
Army personnel (and perhaps other DoD personnel as well) from the widest spectrum of 
expected users.  Failure to do so may result in a system that is operationally effective, but 
not necessarily operationally suitable. 
C.   SECOND SUBSIDIARY QUESTION 
What are the major security and transportation requirements and constraints in 
developing a mobile secure storage system for a fixed facility, and for its deployment into 
an area of operations? 
1. Conclusions 
Perhaps the greatest threat to this design was not meeting established security 
requirements as set forth in Army physical security regulations.  After all, if a security 
system cannot be made adequately secure what is the point?  However, the system can 
indeed meet these requirements by utilizing GSA approved Class 5 Security containers 
stored within a steel intermodal container.  However, this robust steel construction is 
likely to push the maximum system weight of 10,000 pounds.  A system weight beyond 
this ceiling would prevent it from being transported by the 5-ton tactical truck. 
Just as significant was the requirement that this be a mobile secure storage 
system, capable of being deployed into an area of operations using existing transportation 
and material handling systems.  This requirement presented the greatest challenge and 
had the most profound impact on its overall design.  Only an intermodal container can 
house a bulky system that potentially could be transported via highway, rail, water, or air.  
Additionally, only a small intermodal container (the TRICON) can be lifted and hauled 
by the limited material handling and transportation systems found in combat arms 
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companies and battalions.  By using a small intermodal container that can be joined 
together with others to form a standard-size, 20-foot, intermodal container, the largest 
range of Army transportation and material handling assets can be utilized.  Furthermore, 
this standard configuration takes advantage of the full benefits of commercial 
transportation assets and processes.  This standard configuration is a significant feature 
since commercial shipping provides a large percentage of the Army’s power projection 
capability.  Although military airlift systems are not optimized by using a system based 
on an intermodal container, the TRICON is completely compatible if configured properly 
on an Air Force 463L pallet prior to flight. 
2.   Recommendations 
Although the all steel construction of this system ensures it meets the security 
requirements, it results in significant weight.  Lighter weight materials (specifically, 
aluminum security modules) are recommended to improve the transportability of the 
system.  Consequently, any material changes to major components need to be extensively 
tested and evaluated to determine system effectiveness in the new configuration.  
Subsequently, security regulations may need to be revised to allow for these new material 
changes if they prove to be effective.   
The majority of Army containerization initiatives have focused on artillery 
ammunition resupply, pre configuration of division Authorized Stockage Lists (ASL), 
and general force sustainment efforts at the Corps and Theater level.  Although this 
research only deals with containerization of a secure storage system, it is recommended 
that logistics experts and force designers closely examine the utility of small unit 
containerization as a method to reduce their logistical footprint and to improve these 
unit’s deployment response time.   
D. THIRD SUBSIDIARY QUESTION 
What commercial equipment and technologies are available which might be 
suitable for inclusion as part of a mobile secure storage system? 
1. Conclusions 
There is no part of the proposed system design that cannot be easily supplied as a 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) item.  In fact, the author was surprised at the number of 
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intermodal container manufacturers, as well as the large number of companies that 
specialize in the custom modification of intermodal containers.  Additionally, 
manufacturers of custom safes for home use have become ubiquitous across the United 
States.  Lastly, the number of firms utilizing GPS and RF technology, used to assist 
commercial trucking and shipping companies to achieve total supply chain visibility, 
have exploded over the past decade.  Certainly, within these three industries competition 
abounds.  A secure storage design using such system components should benefit from 
this environment in terms of system quality and price. 
2. Recommendations 
 Use a COTS-based acquisition strategy.  Utilize the competitive environment to 
maximize system quality and price, and to consequently reduce overall life cycle costs.  
Additionally, it is recommended that the system be purchased in quantity to net the 
lowest overall system cost.  
E. FOURTH SUBSIDIARY QUESTION 
What are the benefits of such a secure system design for the Army and DoD? 
1. Conclusions 
The following are benefits of this secure storage design: 
• Meets all Army physical security regulations for remote deployment 
• Can be loaded on and transported by the Army’s common 5-ton truck, 
and be handled by most material handling equipment common to the 
Division Support Command 
• Requires no blocking or bracing preparation 
• Configures into a standard 20-foot ISO container equivalent to 
increase its flexibility in both Army and commercial shipping 
environments 
• Deploys strategically by sea, rail, highway, and air (ISO and 463L 
compatible) 
• Reduces cubic storage space within existing facilities 
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• Stores an extremely wide variety of sensitive items due to its 
reconfigurable internal racks and compartments 
• Reduces the need to acquire bulky, hard-sided protective cases for 
sensitive and valued non-sensitive items 
• Improves equipment issue, receipt, and inventory processes through 
information technology automation 
• Provides increased visibility of its contents throughout its deployment, 
and automatically identifies itself for easy location through the use of 
radio frequency technology 
• Operates in all weather conditions and environments 
• Provides for “on-hand” container systems ready to facilitate rapid 
deployment, instead of waiting on leased assets to arrive for outload 
• Provides a standard, systemic storage solution to ease the storage 
planning burdens of program managers when fielding new sensitive or 
valued non-sensitive items 
2.   Recommendations 
The United States Army should consider such a secure storage system for an 
acquisition program; however, a thorough cost-benefit analysis should be conducted to 
confirm the feasibility of such a program.  Additionally, the modular containerized 
concept should be considered for expansion beyond secure storage.  Lighter, less 
expensive, non-secure modules could replace the secure modules and retain all the 
system benefits except for the level of security.   Such a system could be instrumental in 
improving storage efficiency and greatly increasing the tempo of deployments throughout 
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